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 THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
 EDSON R. SUNDERLAND
 Professor of Law, University of Michigan
 IT has always been a commonplace of politics in the United
 Sitates that governments derive their just powers from
 the consent of the governed. It is an equally funda-
 mental principle that the stability of governments rests upon
 the confidence of the governed. When those who are subject
 to governmental action lose faith in governmental efficiency
 and integrity, they are well started on the road to political,
 if not social, revolution.
 Of the three departments of government, the legislative
 seems the least likely to develop serious friction or distrust.
 It operates at a distance from individuals. Only the more
 intelligent citizens know much about its activities, and even
 they view them largely as matters of controversial or academic
 interest. The laws, when passed, seldom bear harshly upon
 large classes of people, because legislation has become ex-
 tremely sensitive to popular wishes.
 The executive department is also far removed from the
 daily lives of the mass of people. Except in so far as it
 participates in legislation, most of its activities are routine,
 and only rarely does it become a critical point of contact be-
 tween the government and the governed.
 But the judicial department stands in a very different posi-
 tion. Every individual is constantly engaged in holding his
 place against the social, industrial or commercial competition
 of others. Actual or potential enemies surround him on every
 side. He must fight to hold his job against others who want
 it, he must fight to protect his wages against employers who
 begrudge them, he must fight to preserve his property against
 a thousand assaults, and he must fight to maintain his health
 against those who would exploit it. Every day brings its
 struggle, every night its anxiety. Few would survive if they
 stood unaided and alone. But there is one source of protection,
 and one only-the department of justice. Without the courts
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 there would be no security. One may never use them, but they
 are always there-visible agents of the goddess of Justice who
 symbolizes the highest function of the state.
 The administration of justice is, therefore, the most funda-
 mental need of society, because through it alone individuals
 are enabled to maintain stable relations with one another and
 with the state. It is necessarily the function of government
 which most intimately affects the lives of all the people and
 is most likely to serve as the test by which they measure gov-
 ernmental success or failure.
 In view of the enormously important contribution which
 the successful administration of justice can make to the political
 security of the state, it is strange that more systematic and in-
 telligent efforts have not been directed toward its attainment
 in this country. At one period in our history there was a
 vigorous movement for reform, which resulted in the enactment
 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848. This code
 swept over the newly organizing west, and is the basis for the
 practice in many states east of the Mississippi river and in
 practically every state west of it. But this reform wave im-
 mediately lost its vigor. The new code was accepted as the
 American idea and therefore the last word in procedure. It
 was never anything more than a timid variation from the
 ancient common law procedure of England, and has probably
 resulted in very little real improvement in the administration
 of justice. Most of the worst features of common law plead-
 ing were retained, and practically no new idea of first-rate
 importance, aside from the general plan of carrying a few
 principles of equity practice over into actions at law, can be
 found anywhere among its provisions. It is a hard and rigid
 system, imposed upon the courts by legislative mandate, leaving
 them little freedom of action.
 It was doubtless due to the fact that the New York Code
 came into existence just at the time when the western country
 was being settled, and when the newly organized legislatures
 were looking for a quick and easy way to put a system of pro-
 cedure upon their statute books, that it attained such wide
 popularity. It was simply copied, grammatical errors and all,
 by the infant commonwealths of the west, and it may be that
 ease of enactment was as strong a recommendation for it as
 the merits of its provisions.
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 It would be interesting to compute what it cost the people
 of New York to attempt to find out from their courts what
 the new Code meant. More than one hundred and thirty
 volumes of New York practice reports have been published,
 containing about 20,000 cases, and if each case represented an
 average total cost to the parties and the public of $500.00,
 the aggregate cost of these practice decisions would be
 $Io,ooo,ooo. These collected cases do not, however, represent
 one-tenth, perhaps not one-fiftieth, of the litigation which the
 people of New York have been required to endure in their
 efforts to obtain a judicial interpretation of the Code
 of Civil Procedure.
 Picking up at random the last volume of the reports of the
 Illinois Supreme Court, which administers common law pro-
 cedure, and comparing it with the last volume of the reports
 of the Supreme Court of Indiana, a neighboring state which
 has adopted the New York Code, it appears that the Code pro-
 vides between two and three times as much litigation over
 points of practice as the common law. More comprehensive
 comparisons would not show greatly different results. The
 conclusion is fairly justifiable that the one great contribution
 which this country has made to simplified procedure has not
 been a great success.
 But the seriousness of the situation in the United States is
 due only partly to the enormous direct cost of litigating ques-
 tions of practice-a complete economic loss without a single
 redeeming feature. A greater injury is suffered by those who
 are unable or unwilling to incur the expense of such litigation
 and to take the risk of having their cases go off on points of
 procedure without a fair decision on the merits, and who for
 that reason are substantially denied the protection of the laws.
 It was an old maxim of the common law that wherever there
 is a right there is a remedy. A truer statement would reverse
 the wording, for without a remedy no right has any value. As
 Lord Campbell is said to have once put it, "The due dis-
 tribution of justice depends more upon the rules by which
 suits are conducted than on the perfection of the code by
 which rights are defined." 1
 There is no difference in principle between a decision based
 127 Law Journal, 104.
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 upon a contest of procedural skill between two attorneys and
 a decision based upon a contest of strength between two armed
 champions. We smile when we are told that trial by battle,
 although actually obsolete, was a lawful method of trying cases
 in England until abrogated by Parliament only about a hun-
 dred years ago, and we marvel that a sensible nation should so
 long tolerate such an anomaly. But while in England trial by
 battle existed only in the musty pages of the law books, and
 was rediscovered there by accident, in the United States trial by
 battle flourishes throughout the length and breadth of the laid,
 with the court rooms as the lists, the judges as the umpires, and
 the attorneys, armed with all the weapons of the legal armorer's
 cunning, as the resourceful champions of the parties. It is a
 system which is steadily destroying the confidence of the people
 in the public administration of justice.
 The characteristic feature of American procedure has been
 its legislative origin. This was a wide departure from the
 traditions of the common law. It was the courts of England,
 not parliament, which created the rules of English practice.
 They were the product of experience, and were slowly evolved
 as an expression of the best opinion of the leaders of the
 English judiciary. The men who made the rules were the
 men who used them. Every feature was the result of careful
 consideration and grew out of the actual needs of contemporary
 litigation. There was an adequacy, an appropriateness and
 a technical perfection about common law procedure which
 showed the skillful work of highly trained specialists. Only
 occasionally did Parliament interfere, where some rule was
 thought to operate harshly, or some new principle of general
 policy or some novel remedy was thought to be needed. But
 Parliament never tried to regulate legal practice; it only under-
 took to supervise the broad course of its development. The
 delicate mechanism of litigation was largely left in the hands
 of those who were expert enough to keep it in proper
 adjustment.
 When, however, the framing of rules of practice becomes
 a matter of general legislation, and a body of men, largely un-
 familiar with legal instrumentalities and methods, undertakes
 the highly technical task of specifying the details of legal pro-
 ceedings, an inelastic and inadequate system is inevitable. And
 [389]
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 it is safe to say that if the American courts had not been able
 to resort to the rich store-house of common law procedure
 to aid the defects of our statutory codes of practice, a complete
 breakdown would have occurred. Procedure is a matter of
 organic growth, requiring close attention and constant adjust-
 ment to keep it operating effectively under perpetually chang-
 ing conditions. Legislative assemblies, made up, as they are,
 largely of laymen, and meeting infrequently, are quite un-
 fitted for the task of regulating it.
 Beyond their inferior quality, legislative codes of practice
 have the further fault of extreme rigidity. Most American
 procedure statutes have undergone little change in the pass-
 ing years, and even the New York code, that monstrum horren-
 dum, as Mr. F. R. Coudert has called it,' which became so
 bulky and complicated as to be almost unworkable, was only
 an exaggerated instance of legislative tinkering with details,
 showing no fundamental change of principle or policy in three
 quarters of a century. Legislatures are timid about making
 important procedural changes, and fear to get beyond their
 depth in dealing with matters about which most of their mem-
 bers know little or nothing. Furthermore, legislative pro-
 grams are usually crowded, bills with a strong popular appeal
 are given the right of way, and there is little opportunity for
 that careful consideration Which is indispensable in success-
 fully framing or adjusting a complicated system of interrelated
 rules of practice. Even commissions for revising statutes
 usually feel that they must avoid introducing any change suffi-
 ciently marked to arouse legislative opposition, lest the whole
 enterprise fail.
 The legislature is the board of directors of the State, and
 its true function is rather to determine policies than to draw
 up minute directions for departmental operations. A shop
 superintendent would hardly expect to get a satisfactory set
 of specifications for an engine, or a workable set of factory
 instructions, from the board of directors of his company. No
 more should it be expected that a state legislature could make
 a practicable set of rules for conducting litigation or keep them
 properly revised to meet the needs of a constantly changing
 society. Technical processes call for technical knowledge.
 1 Certainty and Justice, p. I9.
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 Only at rare intervals, when long suffering from inadequate
 legal remedies has aroused the bar of a state to demand im-
 provement, can reform be expected. Under normal conditions
 legislative control of legal procedure is sluggish, trivial, desul-
 tory and unprogressive.
 Judicial regulation of legal practice, on the other hand,
 largely escapes the weakness of inferior technical quality. The
 courts constitute the judicial department of the state, and the
 judges who preside and the lawyers who practice in them are
 the selected group of trained men charged with responsibility
 for administering the law. They alone are experienced in the
 actual conduct of litigation, they alone understand the meaning
 and effect of the rules, they alone are adequately informed
 concerning their defects, the opportunities which they offer for
 error, and the practical possibilities of improvement. They
 are the only available body of experts in the use of procedural
 processes. It would seem self-evident that they were best quali-
 fied for the actual work of devising, prescribing and improv-
 ing remedial rules.
 Will judicial regulation also be free from the other draw-
 backs of legislative control, namely, inadequacy of scope and
 the tendency to stagnate?
 A survey of the history of common law procedure is not
 encouraging in either respect. The chief source of inadequacy
 was the fact that rules of practice developed only as a by-
 product of litigation. As cases arose the remedial problems
 which they presented were worked out in the course of their
 passage through the courts. Rules grew up at random as
 deductions from actual decisions and were limited to such
 fragmentary and casual points as happened to be involved in
 pending actions. There was no authorized method of gener-
 alizing the rules, and litigants were obliged to stumble about
 in the dark When no precedent could be found. And this
 feature produced another unfortunate result. The precedents,
 when once established, were treated as binding, so that although
 new points of practice might freely come up for determination,
 points once passed upon could not thereafter be changed. As
 the rules approached completeness in detail they became fixed
 in form and binding in effect, and the elasticity, which had
 made the common law so delicately responsive to current
 needs, largely vanished.
 [39i]
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 But the English genius for administration was equal to the
 situation created by the fossilization of common law procedure.
 Instead of taking the regulation out of the control of the courts
 and thereby losing the benefit of professional skill and experi-
 ence, England destroyed the intolerable system of procedural
 precedents by authorizing the courts to lay down in advance
 the rules by which they proposed to regulate civil procedure.
 It was a reform of the first magnitude and marked a new era
 in judicial development, definitely turning the emphasis from
 the past to the future. The fundamental question was no
 longer the static one of historical regularity, but the dynamic
 question of practical social advantage.
 But another problem still remained. The power to regulate
 might be ample, the plan of regulation sufficiently broad in its
 scope, and the requisite technical skill available, but would
 there be sufficient driving force to make the regulation effec-
 tive? Would it be necessary to provide machinery for keep-
 ing the regulators actively at work?
 The absolute necessity of such machinery is well demon-
 strated by a bit of American judicial history. In 1850, before
 the enthusiasm for the New York Code had begun to sweep over
 the west, Michigan adopted a constitution which both author-
 ized and required the Supreme Court, by general rules, to
 establish, modify and amend the practice in such court and in
 the Circuit Courts, and to simplify the same.' No greater op-
 portunity for effective regulation by rules of court could be
 imagined. But it was eight years before the court promul-
 gated the first set of rules, consisting of 54 Supreme Court
 rules, 95 law rules and 120 chancery rules. By I896, a period
 of almost forty years, only 10 new Supreme Court rules had
 been added, 12 new law rules, and 5 new chancery rules. By
 that time a few progressive members of the State Bar As-
 sociation became so much aroused over the deplorable condition
 of the practice that they prepared a complete new set of
 rules,2 entirely changing the practice, and this revision was
 adopted by the Supreme Court. For eighteen years these
 rules remained almost absolutely unchanged, when another
 1 Art. VI, Sec. 5.
 2 Proceedings Michigan State Bar Ass'n, I896, pp. iii, iv.
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 vigorous demand by a Bar Association committee again re-
 sulted in presenting to the Supreme Court a new and complete
 revision, with many strikingly novel features,' which the
 court again accepted almost exactly as it was submitted. Since
 I915 the practice has again settled down to wait for another
 outbreak of reform when conditions shall have become so bad
 that they can no longer be endured.
 I have been unable to discover who actually drew up the
 first set of Michigan rules in I858, and it may be that the
 Supreme Court was the author, since a new broom is quite likely
 to do effective sweeping. But since I858 the Supreme Court,
 which was charged in such magnificently broad terms'with the
 duty and privilege of controlling procedure by general rules,
 has initiated practically nothing for the improvement of legal
 practice. The state has been left to the mercy of the inter-
 mittent efforts of casual Bar Association groups, with occa-
 sional help from the legislature of doubtful quality and value.
 What Michigan lacked was a permanent, responsible and ag-
 gressive agency for stimulating action on the part of the
 rule-making power.
 England made early provision for this necessary feature.
 At first, in 1873, when the new Judicature Act was passed, the
 power to initiate rules was placed in the entire court, but this
 was so obviously ineffective that in 1876 it was transferred to
 a Rule Committee of six judges. In I894 the Committee was
 changed to include three practicing lawyers and four judges,
 and changed again in 1899 to include two barristers, two solici-
 tors and four judges. Meetings of the full Committee take
 place two or three times a year and informal discussions much
 oftener. Barristers, solicitors, law societies, public trustees,
 masters and public-spirited laymen are encouraged to send in
 suggestions for improving the practice.2
 The wonderful success which has attended the English
 court-rule system has not been unobserved in the United States,
 and within a decade New Jersey has completely abandoned
 1 Proceedings Michigan State Bar Ass'n, 1915, p. I3I. This committee
 seems to have made no formal report, but it did in fact completely revise
 the rules and drafted a large number of simplified pleading forms which
 were adopted by the Supreme Court as a part of the rules.
 2 Rosenbaum, Rule Making Authority, Ch. III.
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 the common law system of pleading and substituted in its
 place a counterpart of that employed in England.' Still more
 recently New York attempted to replace the notorious Code
 of Civil Procedure by a system of court rules modeled closely
 upon the English plan, but the effort unfortunately failed.2
 But the last step in the complete development of a work-
 able system of procedure control is yet to be taken in England
 and should be taken in the United States. This is the estab-
 lishment of a ministry or department of justice with a re-
 sponsible officer at its head. Every other civilized country
 of importance-even such British dominions as Canada and
 South Africa-has such a ministry, charged with respon-
 sibility for affairs of law and justice.' The welfare of the
 state is so largely dependent upon the administration of
 justice, and this in turn is so complex and so constantly in need
 of the most skillful supervision in order to keep it in touch
 with social demands, that the importance of such a govern-
 mental agency is obvious.
 Under such a department the entire court system could be
 organized on efficient lines, eliminating conflicting jurisdiction
 and the duplication of functions. Proper administrative control
 of dockets, sittings, transfer of causes and assignment of judges
 could produce cooperative efficiency with infinite possibilities.
 A chief justice or presiding judge, with judicial duties of his
 own, can never successfully carry the administrative burden
 which a real department of justice involves. The head of
 such a department should be responsible to the public, not to
 fellow judges, for the proper conduct of the office. He should
 not be a member of the court but an outsider who can look at
 the affairs of the department objectively. The test of his
 success would be the quality of the results obtained, and the
 public would not be slow in calling his attention to needed
 improvement in the character of the service rendered. Under
 a responsible head the department of justice would be expected
 1 Laws, 1912, chap. 231, (Law actions); Laws, I915, ch. II6, (Equity
 Actions).
 2 Civil Practice Act and Rules, prepared by the Board of Statutory Con-
 solidation, I915.
 aGaudy, Law Reform. Address delivered at Gray's Inn, I919, published
 by the Oxford University Press.
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 to render reports of its activities, and instead of the utterly
 demoralizing American system of allowing the courts to oper-
 ate year after year with never an accounting, we should de-
 velop an intelligible system of judicial data and statistics by
 which their performance could be judged and through which
 improvements could be suggested and devised. A rule com-
 mittee consisting of the responsible head of the department of
 justice and two judges and two lawyers nominated by him could
 make the administration of justice as efficient as the present
 administration of banking or insurance. Centralized respon-
 sibility placed in competent hands is the recognized political
 need of the time. Nowhere would it produce more far-reach-
 ing benefits than in the public administration of justice.
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